



Theorizing about world government has a long and pedigreed history. 
Formulations of some version of the idea already appear in Chinese, Indian as 
well as ancient Greek thought and later supporters include Dante and Erasmus 
(while others, such as Bentham and Kant, offered qualified support only).1 Today 
the idea appears to enjoy a small renaissance (as it did, briefly, after the Second 
World War for, perhaps, obvious reasons). This is not surprising. The world is 
encountering several global existential challenges, among them climate change, 
global injustice, and the threat of (nuclear) war. Some, such as Luis Cabrera 
(2004) or Torbjörn Tännsjö (2008), think that there is only one adequate answer 
to these challenges: to create a world state that governs the entire globe.  
Does the ‘world’ agree? For a long a time after the last great war it looked 
like it did (or, to be more precise, that it was in ‘qualified agreement’): for many 
decades after 1945, the world has seen the continuous development of 
multilateral, international, supranational institutions, the crowing achievement 
of which, arguably, was the setting up of the European Union.2 Of course, all 
these developments fell well short of anything like a world government, but one 
could see – especially if one wanted to, driven by, for example, certain theoretical 
assumptions or commitments – a perhaps inevitable path to this ultimate end-
state.3  
However, as must be evident by now to everyone, these developments have 
in the past years stopped or, at least, halted in their tracks: BREXIT (the 
decision of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union), the election of 
Donald Trump as president of the USA (with his America First agenda) that soon 
followed, the parallel rise of the so-called populist movements in Europe (and 
                                                        
1 See Lu (2016), section I for a good account of the historical background of world government. See 
also Yunker (2018), Chapter 3. 
2 For literature on the developments I refer to here one can turn to the enormous scholarship on 
the EU, the UN, or the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF). As regard to our more 
specific subject matter, Yunker (2018), Chapter 3 provides a concise but detailed overview of the 
history of world government (including movements, ideas, initiatives).  
3 For two good examples that provide also a theoretical context, see Wendt (2003) and Goodin 
(2012). 
elsewhere), the creation of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary and Poland, or the 
most recent election of Jair Bolsonaro as Brazil’s next president are clear 
indications of this trend. At the same time, the challenges mentioned above 
remain and so do the other, more positive arguments for a world government. So 
what will it be? Which way will the world move? Will we see the discarding of the 
idea of world government and, in general, the movement – both practical and 
theoretical - towards an increasingly disintegrated, global community? Or will 
supporters of the idea (or related, less demanding theoretical constructs) win in 
the face of adversity and change the world as we know it? What will it be?   
 
The current issue of Philosophical Papers is not going to answer this question, I 
am afraid. However, it does what it can do to contribute to making it easier to 
find an answer. This is, moreover, a philosophical and scientific contribution: the 
focus is on theory, not on practice, in other words. The issue’s primary aim is to 
see the pros and cons of the idea of world government. I have already mentioned 
names and grounds of support for the idea. But there is significant theoretical 
opposition. Many, such as more recently John Rawls (1999) or Martha Nussbaum 
(2006), think that creating a world state is not a good idea for a variety of 
reasons, both moral as well as non-moral (such as political or pragmatic). These 
reasons can be grouped into three categories (cf. Lu’s (2016) similar approach to 
the problematic). First, a world government is infeasible because it is unrealistic 
or even impossible to bring about, given that, for example, the world is now being 
dominated by territorial nation-states. Second, having a world government is 
undesirable because, say, it could lead to global tyranny and/or force uniformity 
upon humanity: it could lead to a cultural homogeneity that we don’t want. 
Third, a world government is unnecessary. It would be an ineffective solution to 
the above problems and in any case, there are other – better – responses to these 
challenges, such as stronger nation states, supra-national organizations, stronger 
regional cooperation; so why should we opt for such a radical alternative as world 
government? 
Who is right? Although no consensus will emerge from the contributions to 
this special issue, the papers in the volume do show the complexity of the idea 
and the different takes one can have on the above problems. Each article 
approaches or connects to the question of world government in some way, mostly 
in a positive way, at least in the sense of not ruling it out as a possible option for 
ordering our global system of government. In other respects, however, the articles 
differ significantly in their approach to the problematic. Still, the above three-
fold characterization of the possible problems with world government provide a 
helpful framework. All contributions reflect, in one way or another, on one or 
more of the three dimensions: feasibility, desirability and necessity.  
  Several of the contributions are interested in the justification of world 
government. These discussions centre mostly on the desirability dimension 
mentioned above. Thus, Frank Abumere and Sam Director both look at the 
question of the legitimacy of a world government but their approaches and 
conclusions differ. ABUMERE first points out that what he calls the threefold 
argument against world government (the three groups of problems I mention 
above) is importantly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the 
larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming 
unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. After having shown that 
this assumption is unwarranted, he goes on to argue, in a more positive vein, 
that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which 
it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that 
produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the 
social contract. He then ends his discussion with interesting remarks on what he 
calls the African conditions understood as a microcosm of the world.    
DIRECTOR in some sense picks up where Abumere has left off. His 
primary interest is to see how a particular justificatory attempt would pan out 
with respect to world government: he calls it global public reason. This idea, 
originally constructed by the late John Rawls for the case of domestic justice and 
legitimacy, is a kind of contract theory. Accordingly, Director argues that the 
success of this justificatory attempt depends on the sort of consent employed. 
This can be two: hypothetical and actual. However, Director shows, neither 
construal works. If we opt for hypothetical consent, we won’t achieve justification 
because theories of hypothetical consent simply do not fit the complexity and 
diversity of the global scale. And while switching to actual consent might help us 
overcome this theoretical difficulty, it does so only at the price of introducing 
another problem: actual consent can only give us a highly unstable world 
government thereby leading to a failure of feasibility. 
Olufemi TAIWO’s article also focuses on a Rawls-inspired problematic. 
Taiwo’s immediate interest, though, is not in the justification of world 
government; this only enters the picture indirectly. Still, the connection is clear 
and strong. Taiwo’s focus is on what he calls the two-tiered theoretical treatment 
of global politics (inspired by Rawls): “on which domestic political systems and 
the principles governing their internal dynamics constitute one tier, and on 
which the relationships between states and governing multinational institutions 
constitute a second.” The Rawlsian justification for this system has to do with his 
notion of the basic structure of justice. Rawls’s theory of (global) justice is 
relational: certain relations must exist among people in order for (distributive) 
justice to apply to them. The basic structure is his candidate for these relations 
but, according to Rawls, such a basic structure doesn’t exist on the global level; 
what is more, the boundaries of basic structures in the world coincide with the 
boundaries of territorial nation states. It is this latter claim that Taiwo is 
strongly criticising in favour of the (in his article unargued) position that there is 
only one global basic structure.   
 By invoking the problem of stability at the end of his article, Director has 
shifted focus to another aspect of the problematic of world government: 
feasibility. In their contributions, Stephen Clark and Torbjörn Tännsjö take the 
matter further in rather different ways. TÄNNSJÖ revisits the argument 
provided in his 2008 book (referenced below) in a critical manner. He has no 
doubts about the need for a world state in the face of the existential challenges 
humanity faces. However, he now disagrees with one aspect of his earlier 
position: we can call this the transition problem. To simply put, in the face of 
accelerating climate change, we – humanity – has no time to gradually advance 
toward a world government, which, in Tännsjö’s view, should take the form of 
global democracy. The transition to a world government has to be rapid and 
efficient: it has to take the form of global despotism, which would/could then take 
a democratic shape gradually. Tännsjö defends this idea in some detail working 
out practical aspects of the proposal (among other things, he envisions the UN 
Security Council to stage a coup to introduce the global despotism mentioned 
above).  
CLARK, in contrast, is not in favour of a world government (he discusses 
and endorses some of the problems that come under the desirability heading 
above). This isn’t to say that he is against some form of global system such as one 
that is organized more along decentralized regional lines (resembling somewhat 
the position called neo-medievalism nowadays). His main interest lies instead in 
the question of what would keep together (unify) such a global structure: he calls 
such a unifying force a ‘world religion’ (but it is clear from his discussion that this 
need not involve any supernatural element but instead an endorsement of some 
form of what we may call moral equality). He is moderately optimistic that such a 
shared value system could be created in the future building on existing 
similarities among humans, a realization that humanity is just one lineage 
among very many other species and a shared sense of the larger world (the 
universe) around us. But his moderate optimism does not at all rule out doubt 
that we won’t move to such a cosmopolitan state due to persisting divisions 
among us.  
The remaining two articles return to the topic of justification but in 
different ways. In her contribution, Eva ERMAN approaches the question of 
justification from the point of global democracy (an ideal she shares with 
Tännsjö): does global democracy require - hence: justify - a global state? Erman’s 
take on the question is nuanced and insightful at the same time. She adopts what 
she calls a function-sensitive approach to global democracy, according to which a 
particular democratic function determines the regulative principles that should 
govern it, thereby disaggregating the notion of ‘world state’ into different 
functional components. She then proposes and defends five such principles and 
argues that they require supranational legislative entities (world parliament) 
and perhaps supranational judicial entities (supranational courts), but not 
necessarily supranational executive entities (world government). 
Finally, Joachim WÜNDISCH looks at a more ‘applied’ side of the 
problematic. His focus is on the future institutional consequences of climate 
change as seen from a moral philosophical point of view. In particular, based on 
ethical premises, Wündisch convincingly argues that a climate fund will have to 
be set up in the future to compensate for territorial loss due to climate change. 
The ethical steps in the argument, very roughly, are that the territorial loss 
suffered by those who lose their land due to climate change should be considered 
a harm to these people. This harm, being a rights violation, requires in-kind 
compensation and a fund should be set up, with sufficient resources and 
authority, to provide this compensation. Wündisch makes it clear, though, that 
the setting up the fund does not require endorsing a world government but can 
be carried out using the tools of world governance.    
 
On the whole, my hope in putting together this special issue has been to shed 
light on the complexity of and difficulties inherent in the idea of setting up and 
maintaining a world government. I believe the contributions briefly summarized 
above go some way in fulfilling this hope. Final judgment, however, is left for the 
reader of these articles to make, of course.  
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